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ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
EX POST FACTO PAYMENTS
IN LEGALLY-AIDED
CRIMINAL CASES IN THE OLD BAILEY
By PETER W. TAGUE
I. Introduction
A much more pervasive scheme for overseeing the reasonableness
of fees charged by legal professionals exists in England than in the
United States. In England, for example, with or without a specific
agreement over the fee, the client can challenge the solicitor's
charges, and the court or the Law Society will assess their
reasonableness.' Similarly, as part of assigning costs to the losing
party, the reasonableness of the winning solicitor's claim for fees is
evaluated. The lay client can even dispute the reasonableness of the
barrister's fee after the fact.
In the United States, by contrast, lawyers hammer out agreements
with private clients, in civil or criminal matters, that, except in
contingency fee arrangements or with exploitative arrangements,
2
are policed only by the lawyer's risk that the client will change
1. Specific citations to the points in this paragraph seem unnecessary. For a
general review, see Steven Fennell, A Guide to Legal Costs (1993).
2. Although lawyers are expected to charge a reasonable fee, see American
Bar Association, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, r.1.5(a) (1997), there
is no easy way for the client to complain about a fee except to the local
professional board.
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lawyers, lured by a more congenial fee. And with no legal aid in civil
matters in America, private lawyers representing indigent criminal
defendants are paid a set amount by hour, by act, or by case, almost
never with any prospect of enhancement in light of the case's
difficulty, and without much likelihood of review after the
representation has ended to assess the reasonableness of the total fee
sought.
Generally today in England, and before 1997 in the bulk of legally-
aided criminal cases, the defending barrister's and solicitor's fees
were fixed, as is universally true with lawyers' remuneration in
parallel settings in the United States. In the most serious criminal
cases underwritten by legal aid, however, until 1997 the defending
barrister's and solicitor's fees were both calculated after each's
representation had ended. The process of making those ex post facto
calculations is the subject of this article.
There is good reason to examine this now-eclipsed method of
paying legal professionals. As apparently the first attempt (or at
least publicized attempt) to describe and evaluate the process of ex
post determination of legal professionals' fees, this study suggests
the need to expand the inquiry, to examine ex post determinations in
civil matters as well. An assumption of any scheme that has third
parties test the reasonableness of a legal professional's claim for
compensation is that the results are consistent and predictable
within an acceptable range of deviation.' Moreover, the legal
professionals must be satisfied that the distinctions which lead one
Queen's Counsel, say, to be paid less than another are justifiable. If
these criteria are not met, it is possible that solicitors and barristers
3. One commentator predicts that because calculating a solicitor's fees (as
well as a barrister's in ex post facto cases) is a matter of skill and judgment,
not of unimaginative arithmetical calculation, it is "likely that different
people will reach slightly different conclusions as to what is fair and
reasonable in a particular case ..... Fennell, n.1, at 8. Yet, it is also "likely that
the amounts chosen by different people will tend not to diverge radically,
because typical expense rates and the mark-up [for solicitors] for the
locality and the work in question should be known .... Ibid. (citations
omitted). That second assumption is examined in this study.
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will refuse to represent certain sorts of lay clients4 or will be reluctant
to perform some aspect of representation that they would otherwise
undertake if not worried about being denied appropriate
recompense.
Section II introduces the current and discarded systems of
compensating defending advocates in legally-aided, criminal cases.
Section III describes and evaluates the results of the examination of
63 files taxed or being taxed at the Old Bailey (the Central Criminal
Court) in London. Section IV summarizes the results of the study.
II. The Current and Discarded Payment Schemes
From 1997 Parliament changed the way fees are calculated for
advocates representing legally-aided criminal defendants in Crown
Court.' Under the former scheme, cases were divided into two
types, standard and ex post facto (or non-standard). While the latter is
the focus of this article, it is necessary to understand the difference
between the two. Junior barristers (or solicitor-advocates) invariably
appeared in standard-fee cases and were paid a fixed amount as a
basic fee for preparation and the trial's first day, no matter how long
they toiled in preparing, and for any subsequent trial day (a
"refresher").
In ex post facto cases, by contrast, both the basic fee and any
refreshers were calculated after the case had ended (hence the name)
by a determining officer,6 employed by the Lord Chancellor's
4. Not bound by the cab-rank rule solicitors can elect whether to represent a
potential client. While the cab-rank rule ordinarily forbids barristers from
refusing a brief, it would be easy for a barrister to avoid a brief by professing
to be booked or by regarding the expected fee (with non-legally-aided lay
clients) as insufficient, conditions that lift the prohibition.
5. The Legal Aid in Criminal and Care Proceedings (Costs) (Amendment)
(No.2) Regulations 1996 [hereinafter 1996 Legal Aid Regulations].
6. Determining officers are neither barristers nor solicitors, without legal, let
alone advocacy training. Often beginning employment as a court usher,
they might become a determining officer's helper, collecting and
organizing data for the determining officer. As a determining officer, they
often double as a Judge's courtroom clerk.
In High Court civil matters, by contrast, district Judges and taxing
masters tax costs, along with senior executive officers of the Supreme Court
Taxing Office. For a description, see Fennell, n.1, at 132-133.
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Department, based on various discretionary judgments. Standard
fees were the norm. Ex post facto fees, invariably larger,7 were paid
only when the offence charged was murder, manslaughter or one of
a few other very serious crimes;8 the trial, regardless of offence,
lasted longer than three days (or was expected to do so if the
defendant had not pleaded guilty); or a "standard fee would be
inappropriate taking into account all the relevant circumstances of
the case ...."
Queen's Counsel's fees were automatically determined ex post
facto because they are authorized to represent a legally-aided
criminal defendant only when the charge is murder or the "case is
one of [such] exceptional difficulty, gravity or complexity ... that the
interests of justice require ... the services of two counsel."' When
a Queen's Counsel appeared," both he and his junior received a
non-standard fee.' 2
In calculating an ex post facto fee, the determining officer reviewed
the defence's file: the formal court documents, the solicitor's brief,
7. Payments were probably higher for two reasons: more time was
presumably needed to prepare these more complex cases; more money was
needed to lure Queen's Counsel to defend legally-aided criminal
defendants, despite the cab-rank rule that ordinarily requires the barrister
to accept any brief.
8. More specifically, the offence was designated as either a class I or class 2
offence. See "Guidelines on Counsel's Claims for Legal Aid Fees in Crown
Court Proceedings", Archbold, Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice, Vol.
3, tables & index, G-7 at 709 (1996) (Archbold).
9. The Legal Aid in Criminal and Care Proceedings (Costs) Regulations 1989,
reg.9(2) [hereinafter 1989 Legal Aid (Costs) Regulations]. The Lord
Chancellor conceded that this third criterion posed a "most difficult
qualitative judgment ...." Lord Chancellor's Department, Directions for
Determining Officers, Part 3 c.5(4) at 64 (1989). The factors included the skill
needed to represent the defendant, the case's complexity or the "unusual
position or standing of the defendant." Ibid.
10. The Legal Aid in Criminal and Care Proceedings (General) Regulations
1989, reg.48(2)(b).
11. The decision whether to authorize a leader to help represent the defendant
is unrelated to the compensatory system under both the old and new
schemes.
12. The junior typically received half of the Queen's Counsel's award, but
might earn more or less depending upon the nature of his contribution.
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the witnesses' statements, the exhibits, the barrister's advice(s) on
evidence, together with a form prepared by the barrister (or his
clerk) indicating, among other points, the number of hours taken to
prepare and the monetary amount requested. 3 Barristers were also
permitted to supplement this form by submitting a defence of the
fee requested, explaining, for example, the case's difficulties that
required considerable or subtle preparation and execution.
In 1993 the Bar proposed scrapping this scheme,'4 and its proposal
as modified was eventually adopted by the Lord Chancellor.
Known as the graduated fee scheme, the new system eliminates the
distinction between standard and ex post facto cases, and strips from
determining officers most of their power to make discretionary
judgments in setting both the basic fee and any refresher.
Each crime tried in Crown Court is now assigned to one of nine
classes. Each class attracts a different, predetermined amount for the
basic fee, depending upon the rank of the advocate (Queen's
Counsel or "other advocate"' 5), and the method of resolving the case
(by trial, guilty plea or cracked trial'6). For example, if the
defendant's prosecution for kidnapping (Class B) is resolved by
trial, a Queen's Counsel receives a basic fee of £1091, an amount that
swells to £1143.50 if the trial cracks and plummets to £715.50 if
instead the defendant agrees to plead guilty before the trial date. If
the same defendant was instead represented by only a junior or
solicitor advocate, the advocate's basic fee would be £311.50 (trial),
£326.50 (cracked trial) or £204.50 (guilty plea).
13. The determining officer could also gain a sense of the case from the form
that solicitors had to submit to obtain compensation, in which was detailed
virtually everything done by each fee-earner in the solicitor's employ for
whose efforts compensation was sought. For example, the solicitor would
list telephone calls, visits to the defendant in jail, conferences with counsel,
sessions with prospective witnesses, time taken to write the brief.
14. The Bar reacted to the then-Lord Chancellor's (Lord Mackey's) proposal to
extend standard fees to every case lasting less than 10 days, without regard
to its complexity. Correspondence with John B. Milmo, QC, Chairman of
Legal Aid and Fees Committee (June 11, 1997).
15. The term implicitly recognizes that solicitors now can gain the right of
audience to advocate on a defendant's behalf in Crown Court.
16. A cracked trial refers to a matter resolved by plea, typically on the trial's first
day, when the case had instead been prepared for a fight at trial.
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A set payment is also provided for each day of trial after the first
and for each page of the Crown's evidence and each Crown
witness. 7 The new system will be much easier to administer, in effect
resembling the set fees in standard-fee cases under the old scheme.
Determining officers will simply check whether the advocate's
calculation of the fee due is accurate in light of the relevant criteria.
Advocates will benefit in that payment should be made much more
quickly than under the old scheme.
The Lord Chancellor seems to have had three reasons for
adopting the new scheme. The major impetus was to control
spiraling expenditure in criminal cases funded by legal aid. While
payments to advocates are not reduced,"8 the Lord Chancellor now
has a way to control any increase in expenditure by adjusting the
payments for each of the criteria (the basic fee, the refresher, and so
on).19
A second reason was to simplify the calculation of payments.2 A
third was to escape the vicissitudes of the determining officer's
discretion. Indeed, the Lord Chancellor's Department worried that
the awards made by "determining officers using their discretion
17. The payment for a trial day is called a refresher, to which an uplift
automatically attaches. (Under the discarded scheme, by contrast, the
determining officer chose the refresher's size in ex post facto cases.) To
illustrate, if the kidnapping offense mentioned in the text were resolved at
trial, a Queen's Counsel would receive £413.50 for each refresher and
£636.50 as an uplift for each day of trial after the first, £4.93 for each page of
the Crown's evidence and £46.47 for each witness the Crown called. For
each refresher a junior acting alone would receive £145.50; as an uplift, £182;
for each page of evidence, £1.41, and £13.28 for each witness.
18. The Bar thus prevailed in its fight to prevent any reduction in the fees.
19. See Anthony Berry QC, "Graduated Fees in the Crown Court," May/June
1996, Counsel, at 12. The Lord Chancellor was especially concerned over
mounting expenditures in ex post facto cases. In the years 1991-1995, for
example, increases in aggregate fees received by leading counsel
significantly outstripped inflation. Communication from the Lord
Chancellor's Department. Nonetheless, predicting the legal aid cost of the
defence in criminal cases will remain difficult because the overall cost will
fluctuate in light of the number and types of cases, and the number of cases
to which the new scheme does not apply.
20. No longer, for example, will advocates need to keep a record of what they
did and the time needed to complete their work.
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lacked consistency or predictability," and even suspected that
barristers were rewarded for inefficiency because paid a higher basic
fee simply "for doing more hours of work. 2'
Those accusations leveled against determining officers were not
publicly documented. Indeed, it appears that no study was
undertaken to grade the determining officers' work in terms of
consistency, predictability and reasonableness.
Failing to test the determining officers' efforts seems peculiar for
one reason germane to the new scheme and for another, more
general reason. The parochial reason is that not all discretionary
judgments have been wrung from the new scheme. Determining
officers will continue to exercise judgment in a number of instances.
For example, a barrister who returns the brief will not be paid for
preparation unless the determining officer finds that "the hours of
preparation [were] reasonably carried out ...." Also, the new system
does not apply in long or presumably complicated cases,23 where the
advocate's fee will continue to be selected by a determining officer
after the case ends. If determining officers can be trusted to make
21. Communication from the Lord Chancellor's Department.
22. 1996 Legal Aid Regulations, n.5, sch.3, para.18(3), at 15. There are also other
conditions, including the need for the trial to last at least five days or, if the
trial cracks, the prosecution's evidence exceeded 150 pages. Ibid. para. 18(2).
23. This is so when the prosecution's evidence at trial exceeds 1,000 pages or
80 witnesses; with a trial, estimated to last 10 days that cracks instead, its
evidence exceeds 250 pages or 80 witnesses; and when the defendant is
expected to, and does, plead guilty, its evidence exceeds 400 pages or 80
witnesses. Ibid. sch.3, para.2(2) at 9.
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these judgments, 4 why could their decisions under the old scheme
not be trusted, too? Even if the new scheme would have been
adopted solely to better control overall expenditures, these
remaining instances of discretion make it important to examine
whether determining officers acted arbitrarily or sensibly in ex post
facto cases, as a way of predicting how they will exercise their new,
now narrower jurisdiction.
The more general reason to have inspected the determining
officers' awards is the loss of an opportunity to begin the process of
examining the rationality of third-party awards in all areas, and not
simply in legally-aided criminal defence work. It would have been
natural to grade the determining officers' efforts as part of the
process of deciding whether and how to revise the payment scheme
in legally-aided criminal defence work. With such an effort as a pilot
project, further research might have been suggested which could
have informed the Lord Chancellor's plans for reform of the civil
justice system and its funding. Moreover, even with no groundswell
of discontent among legal professionals in non-criminal areas about
the fees they receive, an occasional inquiry about the process is
important to ensure that the professionals are being treated as
expected and that the awards are acceptably consistent and
predictable.
24. There are others as well. To be paid for attending a conference with an
expert witness or for travelling to and from a prison to attend a conference
with the defendant, the advocate must convince the determining officer the
"work was reasonably necessary .... Ibid. sch.3, para.19(1). The
determining officer must likewise find that the preparation was
"reasonably done" when a barrister seeks an interim payment for having
worked at least one hundred hours in a case that will not likely be resolved
within a year of the committal. Ibid. para.7, at 2 (inserting reg.4F into the
law). As the determining officer can reduce the predetermined fee when the
judge criticizes the advocate's "conduct of the case," ibid. para.10 at 6
(amending reg.9), so she can increase it if because the case "involves a very
unusual or novel point of law or factual issue ... preparation substantially in
excess of the amount normally done for cases of the same type" is needed.
Ibid. sch.3, para.17. For the other instances, see Lord Chancellor's
Department, "Guidance to Determining Officers on the Graduated Fee
Scheme in the Crown Court and Example Fee Calculations" (March 1997),
para.1. Last, the graduated fee scheme does not apply to solicitors, whose
requests for an uplift continue to be evaluated by determining officers.
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The next section describes and evaluates how determining
officers made ex post facto awards in 63 cases taxed at the Old Bailey.25
To anticipate the conclusion, the cases in this study support one of
the Lord Chancellor's concerns about the determining officers'
awards, but not the other. The awards were often unpredictable, but
barristers were not paid more simply by working longer hours. That
first concern ought to prompt the Lord Chancellor both to provide
more instruction under the new, graduated fee scheme for
determining officers in those areas where they retain jurisdiction,
and to undertake a similar examination of the way fees are chosen in
civil cases.
2 6
III. Fees Paid in the Cases Studied
This part concentrates on the fees paid to barristers under the old
scheme, but ends with a brief examination of the amounts received
by solicitors in the same cases.
i. Fees to barristers
Ordered to "allow [the barrister] a reasonable amount in respect of
all work actually and reasonably done,"27 the determining officer's
responsibility in ex post facto cases was daunting. She was first
25. While the study was conducted in 1992, the methods of calculating fees did
not change until the graduated fee scheme was instituted in 1997. 1 did not
interview either the defending barristers and solicitors or the determining
officers who calculated the payments. The former were unaware I had
received permission to review their otherwise confidential submissions. It
did not prove feasible to interview the determining officers to ask them to
explain or defend a given payment.
26. A shift to a different system, like the current graduated fee scheme,
obviously can also change a legal professional's incentives to perform
effectively and efficiently. There seems to be no evidence that in fashioning
the graduated fee scheme the Lord Chancellor (or the Bar) considered this
issue, a matter I hope to explore at a different time.
27. 1989 Legal Aid (Costs) Regulations, n.9, reg. 4(2). The determining officer
could ordinarily award any amount up to a ceiling, but could breach that
ceiling in "exceptional circumstances". Ibid. reg. 9(5)(b). For the amounts
as of 1995, see Archbold, n.8, Vol. 1, §6-276, at 1/1085.
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expected to test whether the barrister had worked the hours claimed
and then to evaluate whether he had worked efficiently in light of
"all the relevant circumstances of the case including the nature,
importance, complexity or difficulty of the work and the time
involved .... "28
No barrister was grilled over the hours he said he took to prepare.
Nonetheless, while there was no evidence that any determining
officer believed a barrister had bloated his preparatory time, the
times given in several cases appeared to be so exaggerated as to
justify inspection. Were inflation suspected, however, it was
apparently more convenient to skirt a messy inquiry and simply
conclude that the barrister had prepared inefficiently, and thereby
slice the time for which compensation would be paid. Through this
ostensibly polite ruse, the determining officer left unsullied the
barrister's reputation for veracity, but punished him for having
performed too slowly.
Having a determining officer evaluate the barrister's efficiency
exposes the central problem in the ex post facto scheme. Without
training or practice as an advocate, how could a determining officer
appreciate the problems confronting the advocate and the choices he
28. Ibid. reg.4(2)(a). One commentator regarded the effort as even more
imposing: "It is impossible to state all the factors or the weight to be
attached to any individual factor which may be taken into account in
assessing non-standard fees." Archbold, n.8, tables and index, "Guidelines
on Counsel's Claims for Legal Aid Fees in Crown Court Proceedings",
para.G-27 at 715.
ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
made?29 True, doubling as Judges' clerks, determining officers
would have observed many trials and would know the barrister's
reputation (clever or inept, swift or slothful, insightful or dull). Yet,
even with that knowledge, how could a non-advocate conclude that
a barrister who said he had expended 16 hours to prepare instead
needed only 12 to peruse the brief, identify the applications to make
and the arguments to advance, select the witnesses to call and the
evidence to adduce, plot the cross-examination of the Crown's
witnesses and fashion the final speech to the jury?"'
There were two ways for the determining officer to simplify her
imposing responsibility of evaluating the barrister's efficiency: rely
on the presiding Judge's praise or criticism of the barrister's
performance; ignore the tangle of facts presented by every
barrister's request for compensation and instead automatically
discount the time said to have been taken by a predetermined
percentage. The first way proved of scant value in the cases studied
29. Compounding these evaluative problems was the paucity of information
provided by many barristers. While the professionals were expected to
detail their conduct, in practice only the solicitors provided enough
information to map their efforts. For example, most barristers failed to
divide their preparation into its components - the time taken to research a
point of law, for example, or to mull over how to examine a witness - and
instead simply gave a summary figure of, say 15 hours. And the
explanations offered by barristers who did name the difficulties they faced
were often more self-serving or exaggerated than enlightening. In one
typical example, two of three reasons offered by a junior in defence of his
request for non-standard payment in a one-day trial were unremarkable
(the defendant was a person of good character who risked incarceration if
convicted). The third reason - an interpreter was needed to understand the
victim - was unusual but did not appear to complicate the junior's
representation.
30. Despite many puzzling awards, only two barristers sought more money by
appealing the determining officer's decision. The inference from the
apparent lack of appeals is uncertain, but probably not an indication that
barristers supported the process. More likely, they either tolerated it
begrudgingly or saw no way successfully to object to a process they found
unsatisfactory.
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because Judges commented so infrequently." Even if Judges had
praised or criticized barristers more often, however, determining
officers might have ignored the comment because of the procedural
regime that had to be met before the comment could be considered. 32
There was no evidence determining officers used a standard
discount, despite barristers' belief to the contrary.33 Such an
31. Only one barrister was criticized (for verbosity) and three were praised (for
unidentified submissions). While it is not clear whether the determining
officers were affected by these judicial comments, the criticized barrister in
case number 5 might have been. (A case is numbered if mentioned more
than once.) This junior represented a defendant charged with robbery; the
co-defendant, charged additionally with a murder in connection with the
robbery, was represented by a Queen's Counsel and a junior. The Judge
complained that the first junior's prolix cross-examinations might have
caused the trial to last as long (10 to 12 days) as she had predicted rather
than the seven days estimated by the Queen's Counsel. (The trial ended
even sooner when the Judge directed the jury to acquit.) In his note to the
determining officer the Queen's Counsel also observed that, but for his
waiver of the Crown's obligation to adduce certain evidence, the junior's
protracted cross-examinations would have caused the trial to last longer
than it did. These criticisms probably led the determining officer to punish
this junior because her gross award was less that that of the co-defendant's
junior, as were her refreshers (by £10 a day) and her effective hourly rate
(£45 as against £61). (I derive the "effective hourly rate" by dividing the
basic fee by the number of hours the barrister took to prepare plus five
hours for the trial's first day whenever the case as tried.)
32. A passing censorious comment offered during the proceeding did not
count unless the Judge made the point formally (or the determining officer
asked the Judge whether he intended the carp to count). Then, the barrister
had to be given an opportunity to respond. This rather cumbersome
procedural regime continues under the new scheme, even while Judges are
encouraged to comment. See 1996 Legal Aid Regulations, n 5, reg.9(a)(2A).
The relationship between this method of penalizing an advocate and a
wasted costs order is now clear. The defendant's legal representative can be
made to pay the wasted costs of any party (including the Crown) "as a
result of any improper, unreasonable or negligent act or omission ...."
Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, reg. 19A. Such a payment applies when
a specific act wastes the court's time. The advocate's basic fee is instead
docked when the Judge is "general[ly] dissatisf[ied] with the [advocate's]
conduct of the case ...." Guidance to Determining Officers, n.24, para. 12.
33. See The Senate of the Inns of Court and the Bar, Study of Remuneration of
Barristers Carrying out Criminal Legal Aid, para.1.33 at 15 (1985) (reductions
of 25% suspected).
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approach would have been defeated by barristers who simply
inflated the amount they hoped to receive by the expected discount
rate. Moreover, it was inconsistent with the nuanced evaluation
seemingly expected in determining a reasonable fee. Although
barristers' requests were almost invariably reduced - not a single
junior, acting alone, received what he sought, and only two of 20
Queen's Counsel did- - these reductions were made by inspecting
each case. For example, of the requests by Queen's Counsel, the
smallest reduction from the amount requested was 13%15 and the
largest, 53%.36
The marked variation in the percentages disallowed was
probably caused more by the exaggerated amounts requested by the
34. One of these two instances (number 31) was understandable because the
Queen's Counsel had anticipated the Crown would let the defendant plead
guilty to manslaughter. Notified on Friday that the plea was unacceptable,
the Queen's Counsel had to scramble over the weekend to prepare for trial
on Monday. On Monday, he convinced the Recorder to persuade the Crown
to accept a plea. It did. For 22 hours of preparation he sought and received
£3,000 (an effective hourly rate of £135, again not counting the time taken on
the hearing date), an appropriate fee in light of the trial time he saved and
the unexpected need to prepare for trial.
35. While this Queen's Counsel received only £500 less than the £4,000 he
sought, his effective hourly rate was £95.5 (32 hours of preparation), much
lower than that garnered by most other Queen's Counsel in the study.
36. In this case (number 28) the defendant changed his mind on the day of trial
when the Crown offered to let him plead guilty to a lesser count than the
offence charged (attempted murder). The defending Queen's Counsel
submitted a folder in which he argued that the plea avoided a four-day trial,
and reviewed the defendant's position about a trial or a plea, the Crown's
and defence's cases, and his difficulties during the sentencing (he called
several witnesses to testify about the defendant's mental problems).
Despite his efforts to defend his work, his request for £6,250, involving 22
hours of preparation, was reduced to £3,000. Although the percentage
reduction was extreme, the probable explanation is that he apparently did
little if anything to contribute to the guilty plea. See below n.46. And his
effective hourly rate was £136 per hour, handsome even if less than other
barristers received in cracked trials.
The requests by two other Queen's Counsel in cases that were tried
were reduced by 50% and 47%. The effective hourly rate of the former was
£114 (the defendant pleaded guilty after the Crown opened) (number 9); of
the latter, £91.5 (number 22).
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barristers (or, more likely, by their clerks), perhaps in hope that the
request would itself induce the determining officer to award a
generous fee. Several of the requests were breathtakingly high, with
the acme that by a Queen's Counsel who asked for an effective
hourly rate of £860 (reduced to £535) (number 14). The next highest
was £625 (slashed to £231). Juniors who acted alone were less
prodigal in their requests; the highest effective hourly rate sought
was £200 (he got £140; the trial cracked). Even ignoring the inflated
requests, the effective hourly rates were scattered widely for
Queen's Counsel and for juniors who themselves represented the
defendant.
If determining officers eschewed a standard discount and
exuberantly slashed the amounts requested, the core question
remains to be answered:37 how could a person without experience as
an advocate, who worked with incomplete and sometimes skewed
information and who did not query the advocate about his
37. These problems remain under the current scheme in those fewer instances
where determining officers continue to make discretionary judgments
about the advocate's work.
Determining officers nonetheless did receive guidance under the old
scheme. See Directions for Determining Officers, n.9, and Taxing Officers' -
Notes for Guidance [hereinafter Tong]. Moreover, they began to learn about
the process by first taxing requests of less than £500; then, over time,
graduated to claims up to £4,000, the maximum jurisdictional amount that
determining officers in a Crown Court ordinarily could award.
Demonstrating aptitude, the determining officer would be trained to tax
those claims between £4,000-8,000 returned by the Circuit's Central Taxing
Team (whose jurisdiction covered claims of higher amounts). Of the
determining officers in the Old Bailey's Crown Court taxing group, in 1996
only three were qualified to tax these cases returned by the Central Taxing
Team. Conversation with determining officer (July 1996). Nonetheless,
determining officers were apparently not tested in any systematic way, by
being asked, for example, to tax the same files to see if uniform results were
obtained. One determining officer did tell me, however, that he would
occasionally review the awards chosen by his subordinates, and urge a
change whenever his calculation of the appropriate amount deviated by
more than 10 % from that chosen.
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decisions, place herself in the advocate's position to determine the
preparation needed and the time necessary to complete it?38
No single, simple answer to that question emerges from this
study. Instead, determining officers followed several policies, both
published and unpublished.
A. Publicized policies39
Shortening the proceeding
Barristers could be rewarded for shortening the proceeding.4" In
effect, the barrister captured part of the money he would have
received if, but for his contribution, the case had lasted as long as
expected. This rule reduced the barrister's incentive to recommend
a fight when a guilty plea was more appropriate or, once in trial, to
demand proof of every point the Crown must establish."
38. Determining officers were expected to evaluate the skill needed to
represent the defendant, and thus the skill demonstrated by the barrister
(and solicitor). As examples, the determining officer had the authority to
reconsider whether it was appropriate to appoint a Queen's Counsel, see
Tong, n.37, para.44 at 16; to consider whether a long trial was not difficult,
ibid. para.30 at 12, or was "unduly prolonged by lack of preparation," ibid.
para.28 at 11; whether the barrister "properly" shortened the trial, ibid.
para.33 at 13; and, in general, whether the fee reflected the weight of the
case and the skill and responsibility needed, ibid. para.38 at 14.
39. Another rule was the irrelevancy of the outcome. Thus, it did not matter
that a conviction or acquittal was a surprise, so that, accordingly, the
barrister arguably acted ineptly (when the defendant was convicted) or
brilliantly (when acquitted). These salutary points reminded the
determining officer not to be affected, in selecting an amount, by her
pleasure or dismay at the outcome.
40. In R. v. Bellas, Taxing Compendium, C9 (Aug. 1985), a taxing master
recognized that "where the efforts and skill of counsel are responsible for
the case going short, thereby serving his client's best interest, saving the
court's time and assisting the public interest by the prompt despatch of
business", the barrister ought to receive a higher fee.
41. Whether this rule induced barristers inappropriately to shorten the
proceedings is an important question discussed briefly in the next part.
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Barristers were rewarded for shortening the time needed to
resolve the case.42 For Queen's Counsel, in all but one case the
effective hourly rate was higher for a cracked trial than for a trial.43
The peaks (£535 and £300) were given in a single case where three
defendants pleaded guilty on the day of trial, thereby eliminating,
according to the Judge, the need for a five-day trial (number 14)."
However, the basic fee did not invariably swell when the trial
cracked. In number 28 a Queen's Counsel representing a defendant
charged with attempted murder sought a basic fee of £6,250 for 22
hours of preparation, but received only £3,000, the largest reduction
by percentage of any leader. This Queen's Counsel's effective hourly
rate of £136 was significantly less than that received by Queen's
Counsel in other cases that cracked, and even less than that received
by Queen's Counsel in four cases that went to trial.45 With nothing
42. While barristers also expected higher compensation when the trial itself
ended more quickly than expected, the awards in the study's cases were
varied and inexplicable. Consider two cases that ended on the trial's first
day. In a prosecution of manslaughter (number 5) a Queen's Counsel
received a generous effective hourly rate of £231 when the case was stopped
as the Judge accepted the defence's argument over the defendant's
responsibility. Yet, in a case (number 22) that ended when the defendant
pleaded guilty after the Crown had opened, the Queen's Counsel received
a comparatively paultry basic fee of approximately £114. Nothing in these
files distinguishes one case from the other to explain this disparity in
awards.
43. Under the new scheme advocates will also receive somewhat higher fees
when the trial cracks than when the jury decides the outcome. As
illustration, see text following n.16.
44. The first Queen's Counsel sought £6000 for seven hours of preparation (a
rate of £860 per hour) and received £3,750. Representing a co-defendant, the
second Queen's Counsel received £4,500 (of £8,000 requested) for 15 hours
of preparation. A third Queen's Counsel, representing a third defendant,
also received £4,500, but his effective rate was less, £225 per hour, because
he had taken 20 hours to prepare. The file contained too little information to
explain the differences in effective hourly rates, or to evaluate whether the
outcomes - guilty pleas to lesser offences - were appropriate.
45. Those effective hourly rates were £200 (number 48), £148 (number 3) and
£140 (twice, numbers 44 and 45).
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in these files to explain this gaping difference in compensation,46
number 28 is one of many awards that belies the professed
uniformity of awards.4 7
Doing only work that demanded one's skills
A more experienced professional was not supposed to undertake
work that a less experienced, and thus less expensive, professional
could perform.' In effect, this policy established a pyramid: forming
the base was the solicitor who with his staff would need more time
to prepare than would the advocate(s); in the middle was the junior
who helped the solicitor to assemble evidence, and then distilled it
while advising the leader; at the top was the leader who was
expected to concentrate only upon the important issues and to rely
on the work of the junior and solicitor.
46. The difference is striking when the award in number 28 is compared with
that received by a Queen's Counsel in another case that cracked, number
18. Number 18's Queen's Counsel received an effective rate of £250 per
hour even though he (like the leader in number 28) appeared to do nothing
to cause the trial to crack. Because each's defendant wanted a trial, neither
discussed a plea with the Crown before the date of trial, and neither
indicated that he had to persuade the defendant or the Crown to accept the
plea to the reduced charge. Indeed, the Queen's Counsel in number 18
seemed to contribute nothing to the outcome because his defendant was
permitted to plead guilty to robbery, with the murder charge dropped, only
because the co-defendant's leader produced a psychiatric report that
convinced the prosecuting barrister to accept his lay client's guilty plea to
manslaughter. There might be a way to explain the marked imbalance
between the effective hourly rates received by the Queen's Counsel in these
two cases, but none flies from the files.
47. When juniors represented the defendant by themselves, their basic fees,
consistent with the Lord Chancellor's policy, were usually higher in
cracked trials than in trials. The highest basic fee, of £140 per hour, went to
the junior who took less time to prepare (five hours) than all but one other
junior. While this junior's lay client pleaded guilty, it was not clear how the
junior contributed to that decision. Juniors in two other cases where the
defendants pleaded guilty received considerably less per hour, £68 and £59.
Those amounts were also less than the highest basic fee (£81) awarded to a
junior whose defendant went to trial. From £81, however, the basic fees for
juniors in trials dropped next to £64, and then plummeted from the mid-40s
all the way to £26, the lowest hourly rate received by a junior.
48. See Tong, n.37, para. 107 at 35.
ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
The basic fees in three cases resolved at trial appear to illustrate
this pyramidal policy. In number 5, a murder prosecution, a Queen's
Counsel took eight hours to prepare, asked for £5,000 as a basic fee,
and received £3,000, for an effective hourly rate of £230." 9 In number
6, a prosecution for rape, a Queen's Counsel sought £4,200 as a basic
fee for 21 hours of preparation, and received £3,000, for an effective
hourly rate of £115.1" In number 9, a prosecution for robbery and
escape, a Queen's Counsel needed 36 hours to prepare, sought
£7,000, but received only £3,750, for an effective hourly rate of £91.5
While the determining officers left no clues to explain these three
awards or the disparities among them, a plausible explanation is a
violation of the pyramidal relationship. Because the Queen's
Counsel in numbers 6 and 9 took more time to prepare than did
each's junior, they were effectively punished for having undertaken
work that the junior (or solicitor) should have done. Did these
Queen's Counsel mistake the leader's role? Did each find the
junior's performance unsatisfactory? Did he fail to manage a junior
who was shirking his responsibility? There are no answers, but the
results are intriguing in several ways.
First, these disparities disprove the Lord Chancellor's suspicion
that a linear relationship existed between the length of preparation
and the compensation awarded by determining officers. Indeed, an
inverse relationship seemed to exist. The effective hourly rate rose
when the barrister took less time to prepare, and sank as he took
longer.
49. If this Queen's Counsel had received the amount he requested, £5,000, his
effective hourly rate would have been a rich £625. The junior sought £3,333
as a basic fee, but was given only £1,250, half of the amount originally
received by the leader (whose fee increased by £500 when he complained).
While the file unfortunately does not indicate how long the junior took to
prepare, his four-page explanation of his efforts suggests that the leader
could spend as little time as he did in preparing because of the junior's
thorough work.
50 Unlike the first example, this Queen's Counsel's junior spent less time to
prepare (12 hours) than did the Queen's Counsel. Nonetheless, the junior
received half the leader's award, £1,500, for an effective hourly rate of £88.
51. At £7,000 his effective hourly rate would have been £170. His junior sought
£3,500 as a basic fee for 12 hours of preparation, and received £1,875, half the
leader's award, for an effective hourly rate of £110.
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Second, this policy could have had a deleterious effect on a
leader's advocacy. It created a disincentive for a leader to oversee a
fumbling junior, or even to expend the time he thought necessary to
prepare thoroughly.2
Third, these cases illustrate the fortuity of the junior's award
under the old scheme. In number 9, the junior's effective hourly rate
(£110) exceeded his leader's (£91). Moreover, when compared with
the fees received by the barristers in number 6, this junior's hourly
rate dwarfed that other junior's return (£88) by £22 an hour even
though they both spent the same time to prepare, and almost
matched the other leader's hourly earnings (£115). These anomalies
occurred because a junior's award was almost always half the
Queen's Counsel's,5 and the leader's gross payment (but not his
effective hourly rate) was often higher the longer he took to prepare.
B. Unpublished policies
While the published policies help to explain certain awards, they did
52. While now irrelevant under the graduated fee scheme, this policy
suggested that the leader needed to explain why he had taken so much time
to prepare or why he had not demanded more effort from the junior, but
few did. And unfortunately, the barristers never explained how they
worked together.
53. The junior could be paid more than half in rare cases where he undertook
more responsibility than expected. In one case a junior received more than
half when forced to represent the defendant by himself until near the trial
because of the difficulty in retaining a leader, and another similarly
benefitted when he too was forced to assume more responsibility than
normal because his leader was reluctant to speak with the defendant or to
prepare.
The junior could also receive less than half. In one murder prosecution
(number 18), for example, the junior sought £2,000 for 20 hours of
preparation, and received £1,750 (an effective hourly rate of £70). His leader,
by contrast, requested £5,000 for 17 hours of preparation, and received
£4,250 (an imputed hourly rate of £193). For two reasons, this junior's
award of less than half his leader's is inexplicable. First, the junior
performed very well. Second, the co-defendant's Queen's Counsel received
£4,250 (for 20 hours of preparation) and his junior half that amount (£2125).
This second junior worked the same number of hours as the first junior.
Nothing in the file explains why the second junior was paid more than the
first.
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not provide sufficient direction to decide the compensation in any
given case or to ensure that awards would be consistent. For
example, how should the work of two Queen's Counsel defending
accused murderers in unrelated proceedings be compared, when
one reported having taken 15 hours to prepare and the other 30?
Should the determining officer search for differences in the
difficulties posed by each case? Assess the relative acuity of each
advocate? Assume all Queen's Counsel were fungible, and thus pay
the second more (if not double) the basic fee given the first because
the longer time the second took to prepare reflected that case's
greater difficulties?
While it would have been useful to develop a matrix that
incorporated the type of crime, the barrister's experience, the time
taken to prepare, the difficulty of the case and so on, there was no
evidence in the study that anything so formal was attempted.
Determining officers, however, did simplify their task by making
assumptions about the average time needed to prepare certain types
of cases and by comparing the times taken by different barristers in
the same case. These assumptions brought some predictability, if not
fairness, to the compensation awarded in many cases.
Average time needed to prepare
One determining officer told me that in a five-day murder trial a
Queen's Counsel was expected to need between 10 and 30 hours to
prepare, with the median hovering around 20. Hence, to avoid
receiving a lower effective hourly rate a Queen's Counsel who took
more than 20, and surely more than 30 hours to prepare had to offer
a compelling explanation for the additional time. Conversely, a
Queen's Counsel who took less than 20 hours to prepare would be
compensated as if he had prepared more extensively, on the
assumption, apparently, that he had acted efficiently, and his
efficiency should be rewarded.
The basic fees at the extremes suggest that such a benchmark was
54. While developing benchmarks for particular offences would simplify the
determining officer's burden, their use could result in over or under
compensation. The assumption seemed to be that barristers were not
fungible, so that any barrister who took less than 20 hours to prepare had
worked expeditiously, and any who took longer had been slothful. Yet, it
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used. In the murder cases tried to verdict, the Queen's Counsel
who took the least time to prepare (eight hours) received the highest
effective hourly rate (£231) (number 5) and two of the three Queen's
Counsel who took the most time (60 hours, £83 per hour; 32 hours,
£108 per hour (number 32)) received the least." Similarly, in the three
prosecutions for rape the Queen's Counsel who worked the least (21
hours, £115 per hour (number 6)) received much more, on an hourly
basis, than did the other two who laboured longer than 30 hours (36
hours, £91.50 per hour (number 9)); 32 hours, £95.50 per hour
(number 32)).
Comparing the efforts of different barristers
In cases involving co-defendants or a returned brief, determining
officers selected an average time needed to prepare by comparing
the efforts of the different barristers. In one case involving co-
seems equally plausible to predict that barristers were fungible, so that,
given the mix of facts and issues in a particular case, other QCs would have
taken the time to prepare as did the leader who represented the defendant,
whether that number was 10 or 30 hours. No matter how inexact the use of
a benchmark might be, the lesson for barristers was clear (and remains so
under the new scheme when the barrister seeks an amount that exceeds the
ordinarily ordained payment): to document why the case demanded the
time taken to prepare when that time exceeds what is commonly expected.
55. In a third case the Queen's Counsel received an inexplicably generous
hourly rate of £122, for 40 hours of preparation.
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defendants," the extremes were extraordinary. Six defendants,
charged with murder, were each represented by a separate Queen's
Counsel. The first Queen's Counsel took 30 hours to prepare; the
second, 121 hours; the third, 292 hours; the fourth, 89 hours; the fifth,
110 hours; the sixth, 100 hours.57 The determining officer concluded
that the benchmark for preparation would be between 100-120
hours. Thus, rather than branding the third Queen's Counsel's claim
as a transparent exaggeration, the determining officer achieved the
same effect by crediting him with at most 40% of the seven weeks he
56. In another (number 33) the comparison produced an unfair result as
measured against the ostensible skill needed to achieve the outcomes. Two
adults and a 13-year-old, charged with kidnapping and torturing the
victim, were each represented by a junior. All three pleaded guilty: the two
adults immediately before the jury was impaneled, the juvenile at the close
of the Crown's case. The outcome for the juvenile, who was the most
culpable, was surprisingly generous: a plea to false imprisonment and no
incarceration. The juvenile's junior sought £2,500 as a basic fee for 18 hours
of preparation. That amount was slashed to £600, for an effective hourly
rate of £26, the same hourly rate a junior would receive in a standard-fee
case that he took three hours to prepare (£214 divided by eight (three hours
of preparation and five hours for the trial's first day)). This miserly amount
can only be explained because the determining officer, noting that the other
two juniors had taken only eight hours to prepare, thought the junior had
wasted time in his preparation. That conclusion seems unfair for several
reasons: he shouldered more responsibility because his defendant was the
most culpable and the most difficult to defend, as illustrated by the Judge's
confusion in understanding the sanctioning choices. Indeed, the Judge
praised this junior for his thorough research and able argument in defence
of an (unsuccessful) application for a directed acquittal.
The juvenile's senior solicitor, who undertook all the preparation, was
similarly punished. Not only was he denied the uplift he sought, but he was
remunerated at the lower hourly rate of a solicitor. Moreover, he was paid
for only a little more than half the time he took to write the brief (three hours
and 45 minutes rather than six hours and 30 minutes). Whereas the
determining officer explained why he bloodied the junior's request, he
gave none for punishing the senior solicitor.
57. The determining officer who showed me the case discussed in the text
mentioned another untaxed case in which the preparation times were also
scattered. The first junior took five hours to prepare; the second, 40 hours;
the third, 75 hours; the fourth, 90 hours. The determining officer expected
that the benchmark for preparation would be around 50 hours, with the
result that the first two juniors would be paid more than their time might
merit on its own, the second two, less.
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claimed to have taken to prepare. Conversely, the first Queen's
Counsel would be compensated as if he had worked 70 more hours
than he had.
Reducing the third Queen's Counsel's claim seems legitimate.
The figure is so excessive that an error in its recording might have
occurred. Moreover, he said nothing in his submission to justify the
time he took. Increasing the first Queen's Counsel's claim is more
problematic. Because he represented the ringleader, was he cavalier
in taking no more time than he had? Or, was his solicitor's brief so
thorough that he could prepare quickly? 8 A third explanation seems
most plausible. Because there was little evidence, apart from the
defendant's admissions, connecting the defendant to the crime, this
Queen's Counsel did not expect to do much during the trial. He
could prepare quickly and trust that his colleagues would challenge
the Crown's other evidence. The first Queen's Counsel thus could
probably ride freely on the preparatory work done by the others.
Yet, if that were so, why should he be paid so handsomely for less
involvement? Whatever the reasons for the hours logged by the first
and third Queen's Counsel, increasing the first's compensation
seems no less problematic than decreasing the third's.59
The preparation by the juniors in this case may help to explain the
wildly different times taken by the first and third Queen's Counsel.
The first Queen's Counsel's junior took 150 hours to prepare; the
third's, only 49 hours. The first Queen's Counsel probably relied
upon his junior's extensive preparation, while the third Queen's
Counsel perhaps needed more time to prepare because his junior
had worked much less. The first Queen's Counsel was rewarded for
having relied on his junior, and thus for following the Lord
Chancellor's implicit pyramidal relationship among the
professionals. The third was punished for not having demanded
more effort from his junior.
Rewarding the first Queen's Counsel and penalizing the third
becomes more understandable when each's junior's compensation
58. If the solicitor's heroic effort explained why this Queen's Counsel took so
much less time to prepare, one wonders why he should benefit from the
effective work of another.
59. Whatever the explanation, this case illustrates how determining officers did
need to evaluate the demands of the case.
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is considered. Since the junior's basic fee is ordinarily a function of
the amount received by the leader,"1 failing to increase the first
Queen's Counsel's fee and to decrease the third's would have
resulted in unfair payments to each's junior. The first junior would
have received much less, and the third much more, than each should
when measured both in terms of the time each had taken and each's
likely contribution to the defence. But the way of achieving a fair
outcome for each junior - fiddling with the Queen's Counsel's
award - had its own problems. Instead, it would have been more
straightforward and economical to untie the junior's award from the
leader's. The junior's remuneration could be increased, as the
Queen's Counsel's would not be, because through the junior's
efforts the leader was able to prepare more quickly than expected.
In addition to comparing the preparation by barristers
representing different defendants, determining officers also
compared the time taken by the barrister who returned the brief
with that taken by the one who eventually represented the
defendant. In one case the brief was returned twice. The first junior's
effective hourly rate was £37.50 while the second's was £62 even
though each had taken the same time to prepare (20 hours). For 21
hours of work (16 in preparing, five for the trial's first day), the
junior who tried the six-day case earned an hourly rate of £60.
Nothing explains why the first junior received so much less than the
other two, or why the second received marginally more than the one
60. The policy of paying the junior half the Queen's Counsel's award is not
defended, let alone discussed, in the literature. (Juniors once received a
higher amount, two-thirds of the Queen's Counsel's award. Under the new
scheme juniors will invariably receive half, no more, no less. See 1996 Legal
Aid Regulations, n.5, sch.3, reg.23(l)(c).) It was not only inconsistent with
the more general policy of paying a reasonable amount in light of the
seriousness of the case and the barrister's contribution to the defence, but,
as demonstrated, it could lead to peculiar results. For one, the junior's
effective hourly rate could be greater than his leader's, as occurred in
number 9. For another, juniors could receive anomalous amounts when
one's effective hourly rate exceeded another's simply because the first
junior's leader was forced to take more time to prepare (and thus garnered
a high gross basic fee) for the very reason that the first junior had shirked.
On the other hand, the policy was certainly easy to administer, eliminating
the need to evaluate the junior's work separately from the Queen's
Counsel's.
ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
who tried the case. Should not the third junior have received
substantially more than the other two because he shouldered
responsibility for the trial? On the other hand, if the two replaced
barristers contributed to the defence - each's advice on evidence
had sharpened the investigation, for example, or each's
conversations with the solicitor were conveyed to the third junior -
perhaps the third junior should have plowed the same field more
quickly than he did."1 In the end, the fees awarded to these three
juniors remain a mystery.
C. Defendants represented by a single barrister
Whatever one thinks of comparing the fees awarded to barristers
appearing in the same case and of clustering them around a
benchmark reflecting a hypothetical time needed to prepare, it was
at least a guide. By contrast, in the majority of cases - those where
comparison was impossible because a single defendant was
prosecuted and represented by a barrister who did not return the
brief - no working rule was discernable.
Consider the basic fees received by Queen's Counsel in the
murder trials involving a single defendant. Each Queen's Counsel
took between 15 and 26 hours to prepare. In descending order by
number of hours worked, the effective hourly rates were: 26 hours
yielded £129 per hour (number 10); 22 hours, £148 per hour (number
3); 20 hours yielded £200 per hour (number 48) and £140 per hour
(numbers 44 and 45); 15 hours, £120 and £119 per hour (numbers 35
and 40).
61. On the other hand, the junior who tried the case probably prepared more
efficiently than had the junior who received a slightly higher hourly rate.
That second junior might not have completed his preparation when he
returned the brief. A barrister has an incentive to stop preparing when he
begins to worry that the brief may need to be returned. Hence, this second
barrister might have needed more than 20 hours to prepare if he had
represented the defendant at trial.
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Questions abound.62 One of the three Queen's Counsel who hit
the determining officer's median - 20 hours - received the highest
hourly rate (number 48); the other two (numbers 44 and 45), close to
the next highest. Yet in terms of the difficulties posed by the defence,
there is no way to explain why the Queen's Counsel in number 48
received 30% more per hour than did those in numbers 44 and 45
who worked the identical number of hours, or why those three
received so much more than did the two (numbers 35 and 40) who
took the least time to prepare. The policy of increasing the basic fee
as if the barrister had taken 20 hours to prepare was not applied in
numbers 35 and 40.63
The basic fees received by juniors acting alone were often
similarly difficult to explain. The effective hourly rate in trials that
cracked were: £140, £68 and £59;'4 in jury trials, £81, £64, £60, £43, £40,
62. As the divergence in the basic fees was inexplicable, so were the differences
in the refreshers paid to these Queen's Counsel. One received £250 (of £350
requested); two, £300 (of £375 sought in each instance); five, £350 (one asked
for that amount, three asked for £400 and the fifth failed to make a request);
one, £385 (of £400); and one, £400 (amount sought). Because barristers were
not expected to say how long they took to prepare for the trial's next day, the
refresher was meant to compensate for each five-hour trial day after the
first. Hence, the effective hourly rates for these barristers ranged between
£50 and £80. No determining officer left a mark to explain the amount
chosen.
63. The high awards to the two Queen's Counsel who took the longest time to
prepare (numbers 10 and three) are perhaps explicable because each
shortened the trial. In number 10, for example, the trial might have been
shortened by as many as four days when the defence conceded that the
defendant had participated in the murder. Yet, this explanation did not
universally apply. In number 35, for instance, the Queen's Counsel said he
too had shortened the trial, but nonetheless received the next to lowest
hourly rate. Perhaps tellingly, however, he failed to explain what he had
done or to estimate the time saved.
64. In a case that ended with an ordered acquittal when the Crown's chief
witness was missing and the Judge would not continue the trial to another
date, the junior's hourly rate was £37.50. One might expect that the barrister
would receive a much higher basic fee because the judge was freed to take
another case. Granted, this junior did nothing to cause the case to go short,
but the same could be said about the three cracked trials because in none
did the junior indicate how he had contributed to the defendant's decision
to plead guilty.
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£36 and £26. Of all these awards, in only one - the highest fee for a
jury trial - was there a reason that might explain the amount: the
junior had to work continuously for eight hours, to prepare a
returned brief he received the day before the trial.
Even if the differences in these juniors' hourly rates are
unaccountable, the numbers confirm why juniors strove to be
briefed in ex post facto cases. Compensation in those cases would
dwarf that received in standard-fee cases, as calculated on an hourly
basis. The basic fee in standard-fee cases was £214 in the year of this
study (1992 and in 1995). Assuming a junior took three hours to
prepare, 5 his effective hourly rate would be £27, lower than the
amount received by every junior but one (£26, number 33) in this
study. The more obvious advantage of appearing in non-standard
cases occurred when the junior was led. The junior's effective hourly
rate rocketed up when a leader appeared. His compensation was no
longer tied to the time he took, but to an unpredictable, but
necessarily higher effective hourly remuneration received
automatically by the leader.
ii. Payments for solicitors
The focus to this point has been on the payments to barristers under
the old scheme. Solicitors may want to know how their colleagues
fared in the cases examined, as a basis to predict how they will be
treated in the future, because the graduated fee scheme does not
apply to them.
Solicitors were not treated more deferentially than barristers: their
requests were also often cut, and often for no apparent reason.
Solicitors suffered in two ways. Determining officers decided that a
lower level fee-earner should have performed the work or that the
solicitor took too long to complete some task or visited the
defendant too frequently
65. How long juniors took to prepare is not known because they were not
required to include the figure. Preparation would ordinarily have been
short because the cases were often not complicated and the briefs delivered
only immediately before the trial. Nonetheless, juniors would have needed
to take some time to read the brief and speak with the instructing solicitor.
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In two settings solicitors were penalized for having done work
that demanded less skill than they were presumed to have: a senior
solicitor did something that a solicitor could have done; a solicitor
appeared at the trial when a clerk should instead have assisted the
barrister."
Senior solicitors must reserve their efforts, if they hope to be paid
at their hourly rates, for that "small percentage of cases, the most
difficult[,] complex or serious .... , Senior solicitors would
obviously welcome an explanation of that test. While determining
officers are expected to explain why a solicitor at a different level
should have performed the work," none did. Tentative conclusions
can nonetheless be drawn from the cases studied.
Senior solicitors can expect to be paid at their rate for interviewing
the defendant and preparing the brief when the case warrants
advocacy by a Queen's Counsel.6" That was not universally true,
however. In one murder prosecution (number 3) where a Queen's
Counsel represented the defendant, the senior solicitor was
inexplicably paid at a solicitor's rate. Even when senior solicitors
were paid at their level, many seemed to sense that they had to limit
their participation. They conducted the first interview with the
defendant but not the subsequent ones. They wrote the brief but
delegated all other work to a solicitor. The senior solicitor's risk of
being compensated at the solicitor's lower hourly rate increases
considerably when a junior represented the lay client. One even
conceded that he did not deserve his hourly rate, and asked to be
66. Only "fee-earners" within a solicitor's office are compensated for
representing an indigent defendant. Fee-earners include a "solicitor, a legal
executive or any clerk who regularly does work for which it is appropriate
to make a direct charge to a client." Lord Chancellor's Department,
Consolidated Regulations, reg.2 at 2 (1989). Solicitors are further divided by
experience, into "senior solicitors" (usually with more than 10 years of
experience in criminal cases) and solicitors.
67. See Directions for Determining Officers, n.9, reg. 2B.6 at 20.
68. See Consolidated Regulations, n.66, reg.2B.9, at 22.
69. Fee-earners are paid different hourly rates for different endeavors. For
preparing a defendant's case in Crown Court in 1995, for example, the
hourly fee was £52.25 for senior solicitors, £44.25 for solicitors and £29.55 for
trainee solicitors. The fees were slightly higher for work in London, and
each's hourly rate could be increased (an uplift) if the case was especially
difficult.
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paid for his 19 hours of preparation at the solicitor's lower rate.' In
the 10 other cases the results divided equally, with five senior
solicitors paid at their rate and the others paid at the solicitor's lower
rate. Unfortunately, these cases yielded no evidence to predict the
determining officer's decision. Neither the charges nor the facts
distinguished one group from the other, and none of the senior
solicitors explained why he, rather than a solicitor, had done the
work.
Even when paid at their level, senior solicitors were not always
compensated for every hour they worked. In seven instances senior
solicitors had their hours sliced for working inefficiently. For
example, one senior solicitor was denied payment for eight of 20
hours; another lost 12 of 38 hours; and a third learned he should
have prepared the brief in little more than half the time he took.
In theory, cutting the hours for which those senior solicitors were
paid makes sense. While an hourly rate induces the solicitor to
prepare thoroughly, it also encourages him to dally and to
undertake work that promises no more than a marginal benefit to
the defence. The problem is to decide when the solicitor could have
worked more efficiently. As with the decision over the level of
experience needed, here too the untutored eye could divine no
explanation for these cuts. There was no evidence in the files to
identify the guides that determining officers presumably used to
assess the solicitor's effort.
Solicitors who attended the trial were usually paid only at the
lowest hourly rate, that for a trainee solicitor. The barrister, whether
a leader or a junior, was thus not expected to need more help than
that provided by an inexperienced trainee solicitor or perhaps even
a person with no legal training. Solicitors understood this rule; few
attended the trial. To be paid at his level, then, a solicitor or senior
solicitor must defend his decision to assist at the trial. A few did this
successfully. One solicitor explained that the junior needed help in
selecting the character witnesses from among those available. A
senior solicitor justified his appearance on the trial's first day
because the defendant had never met the junior who had received
the returned brief on the Friday before the trial began on Monday.
70. The offence charged was not included in the papers.
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In the end, the data about solicitors' fees were more tantalizing
than instructive. The files did not contain sufficient information to
derive whatever rules guided the determining officer. It does seem
clear, however, that to be paid at his level a senior solicitor must
convince the determining officer that the matter demanded his skill
or that because of his skill he completed the work more quickly than
a solicitor would have taken.
IV. Conclusion
The ex post facto scheme had the laudable goal of matching the work
done, and its difficulty, with the fee awarded. This study helps in
understanding whether there were rules that guided the
determining officer's discretion in seeking that goal, and whether
those rules were easy to implement. Even with rules, of course, two
factors - the determining officer's lack of advocacy experience and
often lack of sufficient information from the barrister about his
performance - made it difficult to achieve that goal.
As we saw, an important formal rule - rewarding the barrister
who shortened the proceeding - was usually followed. To make that
general rule more concrete, determining officers developed
benchmarks against which to compare the barrister's preparation,
either the time assumed to be needed in particular types of cases or
the time taken by other barristers in the same case. The outcomes,
as the study illustrated, varied widely, and the process was not as
predictable as one might like.
The problem with the old scheme, then, was not that the
payments were directly correlated to the length of the advocate's
preparation, as the Lord Chancellor believed. True, the longer the
barrister took to prepare, the higher was the gross amount he
received as a basic fee. Yet, that result is less interesting than the fact
that the barrister's effective hourly rate typically plummeted as his
preparation time exceeded the benchmarks. Instead, the problem
was the ostensible unpredictability of the payments (in light of the
available information). Perhaps the differences among the
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payments could have been explained, but the answer was not
apparent in many files.7"
On that criticism, scrapping the ex post facto scheme makes sense.
Under the new scheme the advocate's compensation is generally not
tied to the hours taken to prepare, an advantage in that no one needs
to evaluate whether the advocate took less or more time than
hypothetically needed. Instead, the expected effort to prepare to
defend is implicit in the payments for the number of pages of the
Crown's evidence and of its witnesses.
Eliminating the hours taken to prepare as the fulcrum to select
compensation has another advantage. Under the old scheme
barristers had an incentive to inflate their preparation time. Whether
or not suspicious that the hours were padded, determining officers
did not verify that the barrister had prepared as long as he claimed,
but instead slashed the time on the ground he had prepared
inefficiently. Gone is the need for this ruse, apparently developed as
a substitute for the imposing task of policing the barrister's records.
It would have been difficult to improve the old system. Although
barristers might have been made to provide more information about
their efforts, they probably would have balked at such a
requirement, and solicitors even now groan under their onerous
requirement to report their endeavors.
Moreover, while trained advocates would have more insight into
the case's difficulties, the evident replacements for the determining
officers might have resisted assuming their function. The obvious
candidate was the Judge who presided at the trial, but Judges might
71. It could well be unfair to score the determining officers so roundly. Had
they been questioned about the cases in this study, they might have offered
convincing explanations for the ostensible anomalies. After all, they were
expected to exercise judgment, and judgments can differ over such
demanding criteria as they were expected to follow. Even with that
concession, however, there were probably no more than six determining
officers at the Old Bailey qualified to tax barristers' requests for payment
exceeding £4,000 at the time of this study, an amount commonly sought by
the Queen's Counsel in the study's cases.
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have balked at undertaking this mundane (if important) task.72 Also,
barristers might prefer that Judges not learn how long they took to
prepare, and what decisions they made. That sort of information
might affect a Judge as he oversaw the barrister in a future case or
pondered whether to recommend the barrister for promotion to QC
or to the bench. Perhaps by default, trained functionaries, like
determining officers, were needed to implement the old scheme.
The graduated fee scheme, then, has the advantage of largely
eliminating discretionary judgments.73 Abandoned is the fiction that
the fee will always match the work required to prepare the brief and
to defend once in trial. Some cases that do not fall into one of the
narrow discretionary categories will attract fees either too high or
too low for the amount of work actually, and properly, undertaken.
That said, the new scheme is predictable and open, and enables the
Lord Chancellor to control future costs.
Last, although there seems to be no widespread displeasure with
the way ex post judgments about the reasonableness of fees are made
in other areas, this study suggests a systematic analysis might be of
value, if only to confirm that awards are generally justifiable, and
thus to allay any suspicions of the occasionally disgruntled barrister
or solicitor.
72. However, district Judges, taxing masters and senior executive officers do
tax matters in High Court civil matters. Perhaps the participation by Judges
orders the way decisions are made so that an inspection of the consistency
and predictability of taxation in civil matters is unnecessary.
73. In those areas where determining officers continue to choose the payments
under the new approach, the Lord Chancellor should indicate the tests to be
employed more carefully than was done under the replaced scheme. While
the Lord Chancellor has published a primer for barristers and determining
officers to implement the graduated fee scheme, see Guidance to
Determining Officers, n.24, it explains only how to apply the pre-set
amounts in each category of offence, but ignores how the determining
officers are to exercise their discretion. This omission may not be so
troubling if the number of ex post facto requests proves to be small. In that
event, any variance in payments would probably shrink because only a few
determining officers would be needed, and they could police each other as
routine ways to evaluate claims were developed. Establishing a single
Central Taxing Team to review ex post facto requests from barristers
throughout the country, as the Lord Chancellor is apparently considering,
is a step in this direction.
